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Boeing 737 Max varijante

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Mislim da ovaj tip i njegove varijante zaslužuju posebnu temu i ne samo zbog nesreće već zbog izuzetno velike narudžbe tog tipa aviona i njegovih karakteristika.

 

MAX 8

 

737-max-8-graphic.jpg

 

Mada je rano bilo što reći o uzrocima nesreće Boeinga 737 MAX 8 ET-AVJ, sudeći po lokalnim medijima nervoza raste zajedno s listom zemalja koji su prizemljili taj tip aviona. Na listi je sada i Singapore Airlines. U ovom trenutku od kompanija koje lete u Australiju s tim tipom avionom ostao je jedino Fiji Airways.

Špekulacije i analogije s prvom nesrećom se nastavljaju. Predstavnik Virgin Australia koja ima narudžbu od 30 komada izjavio je kako je suviše rano za bilo koji komentar oko njihove narudžbe.

 

Nesretni Boeing 737 MAX 8 ET-AVJ

 

Ethiopian_Airlines_ET-AVJ_takeoff_from_T

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Jedan update, Australija je zabranila slijetanje i polijetanje dotičnim zrakoplovima, tako da Fiji i Silkair više neće slijetati u Australiju, do micanja te zabrane.

 

Za sada broj kompanija i prizemljenih zrakoplova raste iz dana u dan. Kina je u potpunosti zabranila, spomenuti Singapur.

Svi prijevoznici iz Južne Amerike su prizemljili svoje zrakoplove na njihovi inicijativu.

 

U ovome trenutku jedino Europa, Bliski Istok i Sjeverna Amerika promatraju kaj se dešava, pa će prema tome i reagirati.

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U ovome trenutku jedino Europa, Bliski Istok i Sjeverna Amerika promatraju kaj se dešava, pa će prema tome i reagirati.

 

Danas ga je zabranila i Austrija:

Nach mehreren EU-Ländern wurde am Dienstag auch der Luftraum über Österreich für Flugzeuge dieses Typs gesperrt.

https://orf.at/stories/3114913/

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Pratim s interesom ovu nesretnu sagu oko MAX 8 koja se nastavlja. U ovom trenutku (Australsko kasno poslije podne/Vaše jutro) više od polovice isporučenih (350) je prizemljeno čekajući rezultate istrage odnosno reakciju Boeniga na nju. Najveći broj aviona, oko stotinjak, koji još uvijek leti su u Sjevernoj Americi i možda će to tako i ostati jer je ovo ipak nažalost za njih više političko/ekonomska no sigurnosna odluka. Prema lokalnim medijima, prošle godine su bila dva slučaja u SAD kad je avion imao problema s vertikalnom stabilizacijom. Kako će to sve skupa završiti ostaje da se vidi.

 

U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao je jučer podržala sigurnost Boeinga, a to kasnije potvrdila leteći sa Southwest Airlines 737 Max 8 od Austina, Texas do Washington, D.C.

 

Prenosim jučerašnju izjavu Boeinga koju ste vjerojatno vidjeli ali neka se nađe:

 

Boeing Statement on 737 MAX Operation

March 12, 2019 - Safety is Boeing’s number one priority and we have full confidence in the safety of the 737 MAX. We understand that regulatory agencies and customers have made decisions that they believe are most appropriate for their home markets. We’ll continue to engage with them to ensure they have the information needed to have confidence in operating their fleets. The United States Federal Aviation Administration is not mandating any further action at this time, and based on the information currently available, we do not have any basis to issue new guidance to operators.

 

Dole je djelomična lista do sada isporučenih MAX 8. Na listi su kompanije kojim je isporučeno više od tri aviona. Do sada je naručeno 5.098 aviona tog tipa mada su neke od narudžbi samo izraz interesa za kupovinu. Cinik bi rekao da je sad pravo vrijeme za kupovinu jer je cijena aviona pala zajedno s vrijednošću dionica Boeinga.

 

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Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Na wikipediji je prikazan razvoj i generacije svih 737

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737

 

To su četri osnovne generacije:

Boeing 737
Boeing 737 Classic
Boeing 737 Next Generation
Boeing 737 MAX

 

 

The Boeing 737 is a short- to medium-range twinjet narrow-body airliner developed and manufactured by Boeing Commercial Airplanes in the United States. Originally developed as a shorter, lower-cost twin-engine airliner derived from the 707 and 727, the 737 has developed into a family of thirteen passenger models with capacities from 85 to 215 passengers. The 737 is Boeing's only narrow-body airliner in production, with the 737 Next Generation (-700, -800, and -900ER) and the re-engined and updated 737 MAX variants also in use.

The 737 was originally envisioned in 1964. The initial 737-100 made its first flight in April 1967, and entered airline service in February 1968 at Lufthansa.[4][5] Next, the lengthened 737-200 entered service in April 1968. In the 1980s Boeing launched the longer 737-300, −400, and −500 variants (referred to as the Boeing 737 Classic series) featuring CFM56 turbofan engines and wing improvements.

The Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) was introduced in the 1990s, with a redesigned, increased span wing, upgraded "glass" cockpit, and new interior. The 737 NG comprises the 737-600, −700, −800, and −900 variants, with lengths ranging from 31.09 to 42.06 m (102 to 138 ft). Boeing Business Jet versions of the 737 NG are also produced. The 737 was revised again in the 2010s for greater efficiency, with the 737 MAX series featuring CFM LEAP-1B engines and improved winglets. The 737 MAX entered service in 2017.

The 737 series is the highest-selling commercial jetliner in history.[4] The 737 has been continuously manufactured since 1967; the 10,000th was rolled out on March 13, 2018, a MAX 8 destined for Southwest Airlines, and over 4,600 orders are pending.[6]Assembly of the 737 is performed at the Boeing Renton Factory in Renton, Washington. Many 737s serve markets previously filled by 707, 727, 757, DC-9, and MD-80/MD-90 airliners, and the aircraft currently competes primarily with the Airbus A320 family.[7] As of 2006, there were an average of 1,250 Boeing 737s airborne at any given time, with two either departing or landing somewhere every five seconds.[8]

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I dalje pratim ovo što se zbiva pogotovo sad kad su avioni prizemljeni, a nadasve razlozi koji se koriste u preostalim zemljama kojim je trebalo nešto duže za reakciju. Pri tome prvenstveno mislim na SAD i Kanadu. Ono što je za mene uznemiravajuće i simptomatično je politička igra oko sigurnosti putnika i snaga lobija. Zna se čijeg. Nemam uvid u dodatne podatke oko zadnje nesreće koji su navodno inicirali spuštanje aviona u Kanadi i SAD ali prema lokalnim medijima ti podaci su bili već djelomice dostupni i bili su glavni element za zabranu u Singapore i u Australiji još od prije par dana. Dodatno se sad odjednom obznanjuju izvještaji o sličnim problemima s tim tipom aviona prije i poslije prve nesreće. O tim potencijalnim problemima je bilo riječi ovdje odmah poslije nove godine i objavljeni su kao nepotvrđene priče dok se još uvijek smatralo da je prva nesreća uglavnom "posljedica Indonezijske poslovične aljkavosti".

 

Bilo kako bilo i ovo što pišem je hipoteza jer nemam uvid u stvarne podatke već samo ono što je dostupno preko medija koji su inače tradicionalno senzacionalistički i često samo reflektiraju mišljenje grupe koju zastupaju.

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Eto, od jučer svih 371 MAX su na zemlji.

Ono što se i dalje spekulira oko prve nesreće je sustav MCAS koji ne dopušta zrakoplovu da ide previše prema "gore", dakle da je kut nagiba "prema nebu" previsok, da se izbjegne stall. Tu se javlja taj sustav koji automatski hoće ajmo to reći jednostavnim riječnikom poravnati zrakoplov, smanjiti mu kut prema gore. E sad, problem je ako ti se senzori pokvare, tad i kad si u horizontali taj sustav kaže ajmo dole. Kod Lion Aira problem je bio što je sustav uporno pokušavao ići prema dole, a piloti su ga uporno gasili. No sustav je pobjedio. I tu počinje priča o tome da je za taj sustav znao samo Boeing i onaj tko ga je certificirao. Dakle nigdje nije taj sustav naveden u manualima, tako da piloti nisu imali pojma da to uopće postoji. Možemo povući paralelu kao da imaš sustav u automobilu koji te pokušava zaštititi u desnom zavoju da ne odeš ravno, pa ti u svakom zavoju sam od sebe skreće u desno. E sad postaje problem ako ti taj sustav proradi ako si u ravnici ili u lijevom zavoju, a ti se voziš primjerice 100 km/h.

 

Premalo je još podataka o tome dal je uistinu taj sustav glavni uzrok pada Lion Aira ili je još nešto kumovalo tome. Isto tako dal je to bio problem kod Ethiopiana. No da nešto ne štima, ne štima, kad su svi počeli prizemljivati, ustvari već i jesu sve dotične zrakoplove.

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Danas je snaga računala takva da bi avioni mogli letiti i bez pilota, vodeći se podacima sa senzora, planom leta i podacima sa zemlje. Problem je kada instrumenti zakažu

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Čitam jutros da je Garuda odlučila otkazati nabavu MAXova i da bi se predstavnici Garude i Boeinga trebali sastati slijedeći tjedan kako bi dogovorili detalje oko otkazivanja. Prema predstavniku Garude – kompanija će se vjerojatno odlučiti za neki drugi Boenigov model. Garuda je naručila pedeset MAXova i do sada je jedan isporučen. Vrijednost narudžbe je US$ 4.9 milijardi. Kompanija je do sada uplatila US $ 25 miliona. Razlog otkaza je strah među putnicima koji su izgubili povjerenje u ovaj tip aviona.

 

BO4I0423-1024x683.jpg

 

U istom članku se navodi da još nekoliko kompanija razmišlja o sličnom postupku ali da je Garuda otišla najdalje.

Razlog pada prvog aviona još uvijek nije službeno objavljen ali preliminarne analize s drugim padom pokazuju sličan problem s MCAS i neobučenost/nepoznavanje pilota za rad s tim sistemom.

Boeing trenutno testira novi software za upravljanje tim sistemom te dodatne indikatore koji će pokazati da je MCAS aktiviran. Software i Indikatori će biti instalirani/ugrađeni u sve do sada isporučene modele, a bit će standardni dio novo isporučenih. Osim novog software i indikatora, kompanija završava reviziju priručnika za upravljanje s tim tipom aviona a isto tako se testira nova verzija flight simulatora. Nagađa se da će avioni biti prizemljeni do svibnja jer će trebati vremena da se novi sistem odobri i ugradi u sve avione.

 

Radi svog sporog reagiranja, US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) i dalje trpi kritike. Posredno se optužuje za preveliku bliskost s Boenigom i za gubitak autonomnosti. Kao posljedica, Kanada prekida do sadašnju praksu gotovo automatskog prihvaćanja FAA odluka, a slično je i sa Evropskom federacijom koja je neke elemente certificiranja aviona proizvedenih u SAD preuzimala od FAA.

 

us-department-of-transportation-federal-

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Prenosim u cijelosti duži članak (bez nekoliko slika) iz današnjeg The New York Timesa jer nisam siguran imate li pristup. Link do originala je ovdje.

 

Članak je o tome kako je Boeing odlučio da umjesto potpuno novog aviona napravi na brzaka noviju verziju 737 – 737 MAX. Mada je ova odluka više-manje poznata ovdje je donekle sumirana cijela situacija oko nastanka 737 MAX. Članak (bar meni) ostavlja dojam da još uvijek ima dosta pitanja oko produkcije MAXa.

 

Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With the 737 Max

 

By David Gelles, Natalie Kitroeff, Jack Nicas and Rebecca R. Ruiz

 

Boeing faced an unthinkable defection in the spring of 2011. American Airlines, an exclusive Boeing customer for more than a decade, was ready to place an order for hundreds of new, fuel-efficient jets from the world’s other major aircraft manufacturer, Airbus.

The chief executive of American called Boeing’s leader, W. James McNerney Jr., to say a deal was close. If Boeing wanted the business, it would need to move aggressively, the airline executive, Gerard Arpey, told Mr. McNerney.

To win over American, Boeing ditched the idea of developing a new passenger plane, which would take a decade. Instead, it decided to update its workhorse 737, promising the plane would be done in six years.

The 737 Max was born roughly three months later.

The competitive pressure to build the jet — which permeated the entire design and development — now threatens the reputation and profits of Boeing, after two deadly crashes of the 737 Max in less than five months. Prosecutors and regulators are investigating whether the effort to design, produce and certify the Max was rushed, leading Boeing to miss crucial safety risks and to underplay the need for pilot training.

While investigators are still trying to determine the cause of the crash in Ethiopia this month and one in Indonesia in October, they are focused on a newly installed piece of software designed to avoid stalls. The software was meant to compensate for bigger, more fuel-efficient engines and ensure the plane flew the same way as an earlier version.

Months behind Airbus, Boeing had to play catch-up. The pace of the work on the 737 Max was frenetic, according to current and former employees who spoke with The New York Times. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

Engineers were pushed to submit technical drawings and designs at roughly double the normal pace, former employees said. Facing tight deadlines and strict budgets, managers quickly pulled workers from other departments when someone left the Max project. Although the project had been hectic, current and former employees said they had finished it feeling confident in the safety of the plane.

The specter of Boeing’s chief rival was constant. Airbus had been delivering more jets than Boeing for several years. And losing the American account would have been gutting, costing the manufacturer billions in lost sales and potentially thousands of jobs.

“They weren’t going to stand by and let Airbus steal market share,” said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who retired in 2016 from Boeing’s flight control team on the 737 Max.

Dismissing a Rival

Boeing didn’t seem bothered at first by the A320neo, the fuel-efficient plane that Airbus announced in 2010.

At a meeting in January of the next year, James F. Albaugh, the chief executive of Boeing’s commercial airplanes division, told employees that Airbus would probably go over budget creating a plane that carriers didn’t really want, according to a recording of the meeting reviewed by The Times.

Mr. Albaugh boasted that carriers were already paying more for Boeing’s single-aisle jet than the Airbus version. He didn’t see the need to strike now — Boeing could wait until the end of the decade to produce a new plane from scratch, the executive said.

“I don’t think we need to get too spun up over the fact that they’re making some sales,” he said.

For decades, Airbus was barely on Boeing’s radar. A consortium started in 1970 by several European countries, it was slow to compete globally. Boeing, founded in 1916, dominated the passenger-jet market with its 737 midsize jet and the 747 jumbo jet.

Then came John Leahy, an American who rose through the ranks to become the chief Airbus salesman in 1994. Mr. Leahy was relentless. Once, the chief executive of an airline got sick just as a deal was about to close. Mr. Leahy traveled to the man’s house, and the executive signed the papers while wearing his bathrobe.

“Boeing thought we were a flash in the pan,” Mr. Leahy said in an interview. “But I thought there was no reason we couldn’t have 50 percent of the market.”

Mr. Leahy scored a major coup in 1999 when JetBlue decided to launch with a fleet composed entirely of Airbus A320s. In the years that followed, more low-cost carriers around the world, like easyJet, placed big orders, too.

Airbus had pulled ahead of Boeing by 2005. “Boeing has struggled with the development work needed to take the company into the 21st century,” Tim Clark, president of Emirates, the Dubai airline, said that year. Airbus, he said, “has been braver, more brazen.”

In 2008, Airbus delivered 483 airplanes, while Boeing delivered just 375. Three years later at the Paris Air Show, Airbus took orders for 730 aircraft, worth some $72.2 billion, with its new fuel-efficient version dominating.

“Boeing was just completely arrogant in dismissing the viability of the A320,” said Scott Hamilton, managing director of the Leeham Company, an aviation consulting firm.

As American considered placing its largest-ever aircraft order exclusively with Airbus in the spring of 2011, executives at the carrier initially didn’t believe Boeing thought that the threat was real, according to a person involved with the discussions, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Airbus had a team camped out in a suite at the Ritz-Carlton in Dallas, near American’s headquarters. Mr. Leahy traveled to Dallas and dined with the American chief, Mr. Arpey, at the Mansion on Turtle Creek, a five-star hotel. Boeing visited less frequently, according to several people involved in the sales process.

With American pondering which planes to buy, Boeing made a business decision. A former senior Boeing official said the company opted to build the Max because it would be far quicker, easier and cheaper than starting from scratch, and would provide almost as much fuel savings for airlines.

Eventually, American decided to make deals with both Boeing and Airbus, buying hundreds of jets from each. Mr. Arpey called Mr. McNerney again, this time reading from a script to carefully calibrate his words. First, he congratulated the Boeing chief on the deal, according to the person with knowledge of the discussions. Then he broke the news that American would also place an order with Airbus.

‘Intense Pressure Cooker’

Inside Boeing, the race was on. Roughly six months after the project’s launch, engineers were already documenting the differences between the Max and its predecessor, meaning they already had preliminary designs for the Max — a fast turnaround, according to an engineer who worked on the project.

“The timeline was extremely compressed,” the engineer said. “It was go, go, go.”

One former designer on the team working on flight controls for the Max said the group had at times produced 16 technical drawings a week, double the normal rate. “They basically said, ‘We need something now,’” the designer said.

A technician who assembles wiring on the Max said that in the first months of development, rushed designers were delivering sloppy blueprints to him. He was told that the instructions for the wiring would be cleaned up later in the process, he said.

His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions.

Despite the intense atmosphere, current and former employees said, they felt during the project that Boeing’s internal quality checks ensured the aircraft was safe.

In a statement, Boeing said: “The Max program launched in 2011. It was offered to customers in September 2012. Firm configuration of the airplane was achieved in July 2013. The first completed 737 Max 8 rolled out of the Renton factory in November 2015.”

The company added, “A multiyear process could hardly be considered rushed.”

At the heart of Boeing’s push was a focus on creating a plane that was essentially the same as earlier 737 models, important for getting the jet certified quickly. It would also help limit the training that pilots would need, cutting down costs for airlines.

Rick Ludtke, an engineer who helped design the 737 Max cockpit and spent 19 years at Boeing, said the company had set a ground rule for engineers: Limit changes to hopefully avert a requirement that pilots spend time training in a flight simulator before flying the Max.

“Any designs we created could not drive any new training that required a simulator,” Mr. Ludtke said. “That was a first.”

When upgrading the cockpit with a digital display, he said, his team wanted to redesign the layout of information to give pilots more data that were easier to read. But that might have required new pilot training.

So instead, they simply recreated the decades-old gauges on the screen. “We just went from an analog presentation to a digital presentation,” Mr. Ludtke said. “There was so much opportunity to make big jumps, but the training differences held us back.”

“This program was a much more intense pressure cooker than I’ve ever been in,” he added. “The company was trying to avoid costs and trying to contain the level of change. They wanted the minimum change to simplify the training differences, minimum change to reduce costs, and to get it done quickly.”

Boeing said in a statement that the 2011 decision to build the Max had beaten out other options, including developing a new airplane.

“The decision had to offer the best value to customers, including operating economics as well as timing, which was clearly a strong factor,” the company said. “Safety is our highest priority as we design, build and support our airplanes.”

A Cascade of Changes

Months before Boeing’s announcement of the Max, the commercial airplanes executive, Mr. Albaugh, critiqued the decision by Airbus to refit the A320 with bigger engines, which could alter the aerodynamics and require big changes to the plane.

“It’s going to be a design change that will ripple through the airplane,” Mr. Albaugh said in the meeting with employees.

“I think they’ll find it more challenging than they think it will be,” he told them. “When they get done, they’ll have an airplane that might be as good as the Next Generation 737,” a plane that Boeing had launched in 1997.

But a main selling point of the new A320 was its fuel-efficient engines. To match Airbus, Boeing needed to mount the Max with its own larger and powerful new engines.

Just as Mr. Albaugh had predicted for Airbus, the decision created a cascade of changes. The bigger engines altered the aerodynamics of the plane, making it more likely to pitch up in some circumstances.

To offset that possibility, Boeing added the new software in the Max, known as MCAS, which would automatically push the nose down if it sensed the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle. The goal was to avoid a stall. Because the system was supposed to work in the background, Boeing believed it didn’t need to brief pilots on it, and regulators agreed. Pilots weren’t required to train in simulators.

The push for automation was a philosophical shift for Boeing, which for decades wanted to keep pilots in control of the planes as much as possible. Airbus, by comparison, tended to embrace technology, putting computers in control. Pilots who preferred the American manufacturer even had a saying: “If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going.”

The new software system is now a focus of investigators who are trying to determine what went wrong in the Ethiopian Airlines crash and the Lion Air tragedy in Indonesia. A leading theory in the Lion Air crash is that the system was receiving bad data from a faulty sensor, triggering an unrecoverable nose dive. All 737 Max jets around the world are grounded, and Boeing has given no estimate of when they might return to flight.

In Renton, Wash., where the 737 Max is produced in a 1.1-million-square-foot plant, the mere possibility that Boeing engineering contributed to the crashes has cast a pall over the factory. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing offered trauma counseling to engineers who had worked on the plane.

“People in my group are devastated by this,” said Mr. Renzelmann, the former Boeing technical engineer. “It’s a heavy burden.”

In a statement, Boeing’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, said he had spent time in Renton recently and “saw firsthand the pride our people feel in their work and the pain we’re all experiencing in light of these tragedies.”

Boeing is working on an update to MCAS software. The company was meeting with carriers over the weekend to discuss the update, which is expected to roll out by April. It also intends to make a previously optional safety indicator in its cockpit standard in new Max jets.

The business is increasingly under pressure as airlines reconsider their orders and ask for compensation. But work in Renton is continuing apace.

Boeing now makes a record 52 737s a month — most of them Maxes — and aims to reach 57 by April. As fuselages and plane skeletons continued to chug into the factory by train this past week, crews worked around the clock to make thousands more.

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Boeing se pogubio. Sumanute psihopate u managementu vode barem civilni dio proizvodnje. Dva dokumentarna priloga o ovome najviše govore. Još 737NG je imao inherentne probleme:

 

https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/20101214104637901849.html

 

Užas:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvkEpstd9os

 

Za sada Boeing služi samo da bi Airbus proizvodio ok avione i da nema monopol...

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To me podsjeća na istinitu šalu iz drugog područja a prenesena na avio industriju glasi otprilike ovako.

 

Koja je najbolja reklama za Airbus 320?

- Boeing 737 MAX!


Deda je vozio seriju 32

Ja sam samo običan ferroequinolog

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Saga oko MAXova se nastavlja i na vidjelo izlazi, blago rečeno, brzopletnost Boeinga u procesu finaliziranja tog tipa aviona i procesa testiranja aviona. Što je još gore sve je vidljivije i zabrinjavajuće vrlo blizak odnos FAA s kompanijom. FAA je ne samo dozvolila Boeingu finalno testiranje pojedinih dijelove aviona već se u izdavanju licence za komercijalnu upotrebu čini se uglavnom oslanjala na podatke koje im je dao Boeing bez većeg nezavisnog testiranja. Izgleda da je to sve imalo lančani efekt na ostale zemlje koje su odobravale let tog tipa aviona bazirajući dobar dio odluke na nalazima FAA jer je FAA tada imala reputaciju… koje sad više nema.

 

Lokalno, ovdje u Australiji Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) je izjavila da je koristila dio podataka od FAA i da je to bila uobičajena praksa. Trenutno, CASA inicira reviziju procesa izdavanja licenci avionima bez obzira na proizvođača ali nema planova za reviziju dosadašnjih licenci. Kinezi su izjavili da više neće preuzimati podatke od FAA… i tako dalje. Lista zemalja koje su službeno donijeli sličnu odluku je svaki dan sve duža. Čini se da će sve ovo produžiti prizemljenje MAXova na duži period od prvotno planiranog – svibanj jer će postupak odobravanja potrajati ovaj put malo duže, a čini se isto tako da Boeing usprkos obećanjima još nije riješio sve probleme oko novog softwarea koji bi trebao eliminirati probleme s kojim su se suočili piloti (i putnici) dva nesretna aviona.

 

Dio prizemljenih MAXova

 

2019-03-27t104247z1lynxnpef2q0mwrtroptp4

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Sramota za Boeing i FAA. Ta perverzna ljubav već dugo traje a ovakvo vođenje posla uvijek, ali uvijek završi loše. I sada će Boeing platiti cijenu "žurbe". Ne znam kako u ovom slučaju ide sa obeštećenjem airliner-a, past će prodaja, dojam pouzdanosti Boeing-a i sl...

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Vrlo informativan (poduži) članak o nesreći, avionu, obuci pilota, odnosu FAA i Boeinga te o budućnosti tog aviona. Članak je na engleskom s BBCa.

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/boeing_two_deadly_crashes

 

737 max 8 cockpit

 

dcxygjwvwaayndl-jpg-large.jpeg

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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U šta su se doveli... kakva legenda zrakoplovstva a sada jad i bijeda žurbe i pohlepe..

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Ovome gore se može dodati i tužba uložena ovih dana u kojoj više od 400 američkih pilota tuže Boeing za prikrivanja istine o problemima aviona. Piloti koji imaju licencu za upravljanjem MAXom traže odštetu za gubitak prihoda te odštetu za pretrpljene psihičke posljedice nastale postupcima Boeinga i posljedicama te situacije. Link do članaka.

 

Ovome se još može dodati prošlomjesečni kraći medijski pokušaj lobija da krivicu za pad Etiopskog aviona pripiše pilotima.

 

Mislim da će usprkos svemu Boeing isplivati jer im je lobi izuzetno jak, broj ljudi koji ovise o njemu velik, a k tome potražanja za avionima te kategorije je velika.

 

Kraći video o parkiranim avionima

 

 

Medo

 


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Boeing se možda izvuče i u tome mu silno pomaže duopolski tržišni status te dosadašnja reputacija (koja se topi kao snijeg u proljeće). No debakl koji se događa u Boeingu vuče korijene već 10+ godina unazad kroz kataklizmički loš top a vjerojatno i middle management. Još sa 737NG su imali skrivene probleme. Danas se NG pokazuje kao extremno pouzdan no određene stvari u kontroli proizvodnje su počele zakazivati..

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Pomaže i meka i tvrda diplomacija SAD-a jer ovo je ipak strateška industrija u bilo kojem smislu... Tu i tamo očito će morati i dodatne subvencije jer već ovo je neizmjerno skupo.

 

Avioindustrija je strpljiva tako da se obično neće uznemiriti na katastrofične naslove, pa ni na prave katastrofe ako ih se može riješiti.

Samo u ovoj situaciji rješenje nije jasno a strukturni problemi stvarni, i pitanje je koliko si naručitelji mogu priuštiti čekanja i stvarne nepouzdanosti ako se problemi nastave otkrivati i cijeli američki liberalizirani sustav kontrole gdje je Boeing sam sebi davao certifikate umjesto FAA bude nepouzdan koliko i zvuči.

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BBC Panorama: Boeing's Killer Planes, 737 Max

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ShF9XMoNQc

 

Medo


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The 50-50-90 rule: Anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting something right, there's a 90% probability you'll get it wrong.

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Boeing sa lošega na gore pa na najgore. Teški psihopati vode Boeing danas i ovo je plod njihovog "vodstva". Žele sjaj i blještavilo odmah i na prvu, visoke cijene dionica, bonuse a iza toga ruglo kakvo valjda nije bilo u Boeingu od osnutka. Iako se čini "ne baš toliko strašno", jako će teško vratiti reputaciju a sa ovima na čelu nikada.

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